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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DETERMINANT OF 
THE US FINANCIAL CEOS’ COMPENSATION FOR THE POST-
FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIOD 
 
Eunsup Daniel Shim*, Jooh Lee** 
 
Absctract 
 
The US financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent Global Financial Crisis were considered by many 
economists the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a results, Dodd-Frank 
Act has passed and aims “(1) to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", (2) to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, (3) to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices, and for other purposes.”*** The enactment of Dodd-Frank Act, in part, intended to 
significantly influence accountability on executive compensation especially for the financial 
institutions.  
This paper empirically investigates the changes in Financial CEOs’ compensation since the Financial 
Crisis of 2008. Our findings show that in the post- Financial Crisis period financial leverage is 
significant factor influencing the CEOs’ total compensation. In addition market based performance 
such as stock price and market-to-book ratio shows significant positive relationship with CEO 
compensation. This change can be interpreted an attempt to reduce opportunistic behavior of top 
executives after the financial crisis and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 resulted in the biggest 
failure in U.S. banking and financial institutions 
including the failure of Wachovia, the fourth-largest 
U.S. bank, the meltdown of Washington Mutual and 
Lehman Brothers.  In addition icon of American 
corporations such as Chrysler and GM has declared 
the bankruptcy. It brought executive compensation 
issues back into focus. In 2002, US Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) was passed in order to regain the 
confidence of market participants and to improve 
transparency capital market in U.S. SOX has been 
referred to as the top legal milestone (Myers, 2005) 
and the most comprehensive public company 
legislation (Green, 2004). This enactment has had a 
broad impact not only on the U.S market but also on 
global capital markets. Despite the SOX, US financial 
market experienced another severe financial crisis and 
in turn global financial crisis, which is considered as 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. A $700 billion emergency bailout plan was 
initiated to prevent “the end of the US economy.” 
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 brought the most 
significant changes to affect all federal financial 
regulatory agencies and almost every part of the 
nation's financial services industry. It attempts to 
improve Wall Street transparency and accountability, 
investor protections and improvements to the 
regulation of Securities and executive compensation 
among others. The Dodd-Frank reinforces 
accountability of top executive and improve 
transparency of executive compensation by requiring  
at least once every 3 years, a public corporation is 
required to submit to a shareholder vote the approval 
of executive compensation. In addition members of 
the Board of Director’s Compensation Committee 
shall be an independent member of the board of 
directors, a compensation consultant or legal council. 
The Act authorizes the SEC to adopt rules giving 
nominating shareholders access to the company’s 
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proxy. In addition, the Act requires enhanced 
disclosure of executive compensation and gives 
shareholders the right to a “say-on-pay” vote on 
executive compensation. For Financial Institutions, the 
Act imposes significant new regulations on banking 
organizations and “nonbank financial companies,” 
such as insurance companies and investment firms. 
The Act gives U.S. governmental authorities more 
funding, more information and more power. In broad 
and significant areas, the Act endows regulators with 
wholly discretionary authority to write and interpret 
new rules.
1
 
This study examines changes in executive 
compensation practices since the Financial Crisis of 
2008 in relation to the Dodd- Frank Act. This study 
makes important contributions and adds value to 
current corporate governance and CEO compensation 
literature. This study presents a longitudinal and 
comprehensive analysis with the most recent available 
data for 78 financial firms (234 firm-year 
observations) for 3 year periods on post-financial 
crisis period (2009-2011). These sample will provide 
us better understanding and insights about changes in 
CEO compensation in the post-financial crisis period. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
second section presents theoretical background and 
hypotheses. The third section describes sample, 
descriptive statistics, and research methodology. The 
final section discusses the results and provides 
analysis and conclusions.  
 
2 Theoretical background and research 
hypotheses 
 
2.1 Literature review 
 
The study of CEO compensation on post-financial 
crisis is very important but literature is limited.  In 
order to examine the impact of the Financial crisis and 
the Dodd-Frank Act, one can use the framework and 
literature of the impact of the SOX Act 2002. Cianci, 
et. al. (2011) examines the relationship between 
corporate governance, CEO dominance and executive 
compensation comparing pre- and post- SOX. They 
focus on the differential impact on the compensation 
of CEO dominance and traditional corporate 
governance variables. Cianci, Femando, and Werner 
select 4 years prior to SOX and the 4 years after SOX 
as their sample period. With OLS regression, they find 
results that SOX has changed the CEO duality and 
compensation relation but it has not changed the CEO 
dominance-compensation relation. It indicates that 
regulatory reforms, like SOX, do not limit a CEO’s 
power to obstruct such traditional governance 
mechanisms and extract higher rents in the form of 
compensation. But SOX may have improved the 
                                                          
1
 Dodd-Frank Act Becomes Law, Posted by William Sweet, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP on Wednesday 
July 21, 2010 at 11:49 am  
relationship between traditional corporate governance 
variables and compensation. 
Jaque (2008) investigates instruments for 
compensating executives, empirical regularities about 
executive pay, level of pay and regulatory changes 
affecting executive compensation. This paper focuses 
on factors that affect executive compensation. Jaque 
observes that the composition of payment has moved 
away from fixed compensation and moved 
increasingly toward performance-based compensation. 
Although annual salaries have been increasing, the 
proportion of total pay has decreased in the last 20 
years, while compensation through options has 
become the most important component, increasing 
from a low of 35 percent to 77 percent. Jaque argues 
that the SOX requirements for the qualification of 
bonus contracts could be distorting compensation 
practices when in fact the discretion of the 
compensation board may be able to reward executives. 
Wang (2003) examined how increased internal 
control disclosure requirements mandated by SOX 
affects annual corporate governance decisions 
regarding CFOs. This paper uses a sample of 27,979 
executive-year observations from 1998 to 2005. Using 
non-CEO and non-COO executive officers as a control 
group, it finds that CFOs of firms with weak internal 
controls receive lower compensation and experience 
higher forced turnover rates after the passage of SOX. 
In contrast, CFOs of firms with strong internal 
controls receive higher compensation and do not 
experience significant changes in forced turnover 
rates. The other main finding is that there is significant 
increase in the level of CFO salary, bonus, and total 
compensation in the post-SOX period compared to the 
pre-SOX period for firms with strong internal 
controls.These results support the notion that 
mandated increases in disclosure reduce information 
asymmetry in the executive labor market.  
Cohen, Dey, & Lys, (2008) investigated the 
prevalence of both accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities in the period leading to the 
passage of SOX and in the period following the 
passage of SOX. They divided the sample period into 
two time periods: the period prior to the passage of 
SOX (the pre-SOX period: 1987-2001) and the period 
after the passage of SOX (the post-SOX period: 2002-
2005). They subdivided the pre-SOX period into two 
sub periods: the period prior to major corporate 
scandals (the pre-SOX period: 1987-1999) and the 
period immediately preceding the passage of SOX 
when the major scandals occurred (the SCA period: 
2000-2001). The main findings are that accrual-based 
earnings management increased steadily from 1987 
until the passage of the SOX in 2002, followed by a 
significant decline after the passage of SOX. In 
contrast, the level of real earnings management 
activities declined prior to SOX and increased 
significantly after the passage of SOX. In addition, 
new options granted during the post-SOX period are 
negatively associated with income-increasing accrual-
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based earnings management, unexercised options are 
positively associated with income-increasing accrual-
based earnings management. 
Murphy (2003) has examined stock-based pay in 
a new economy. By early 2000, internet and electronic 
commerce would fundamentally change the global 
economy. These firms exploited internet, e-commerce 
and related advancement technologies and are loosely 
called “new economy” firms. Murphy complements 
the ILL (Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker) results by 
analyzing data from 1992 to 2001 and documents the 
effect of the 2000 market crash on stock-based pay in 
new economy firms. There are differences in the pay 
practice between new and old economy firms that new 
economy firms use the extensive stock options as 
compensation for both top-executives and lower-level 
employees. However, the new economy boon was 
ultimately unsustainable and the market crash left 
worthless with underwater options. The rise and fall of 
the new economy sector gave us an opportunity to 
learn more about stock-based compensation.  
In regards to board committees, CEO 
compensation, and earnings management, Laux & 
Laux (2009) have analyzed the board of directors’ 
equilibrium strategies for setting CEO incentive pay, 
overseeing financial reporting and their effects on the 
level of earnings management. Stock-based 
compensation schemes tend to encourage CEOs to 
manipulate earnings, which in turn makes it necessary 
for the board to act as a vigilant overseer. However, 
the increase in CEO equity incentives does not 
necessarily lead to a higher level of earnings 
management because the audit committee will adjust 
its oversight effort in response to a change in CEO 
incentives. SOX assigns directors serving on the audit 
committee with the special responsibility of 
overseeing the firm’s financial accounting process. 
Therefore the separation of board functions will lead 
to stronger pay-performance sensitivity. 
Döscher & Friedl (2011) focuses on the 
informational role of the board. One of the most 
important roles of the board is to lower the 
information asymmetry between the shareholders and 
CEO. This paper studies the effect of a possible 
collusion between a CEO and the board and examines 
the optimal contract between the shareholders and a 
CEO. They expect that companies with 
nonindependent boards should have higher board 
compensation, and lower executive compensation than 
their counterparts with independent boards. Empirical 
evidence on this issue is mixed, though the power of 
stakeholder groups should have an influence on CEO 
compensation.  
Vitito et. al. (2008) studied 79,650 observations 
of compensation related to the five most highly paid 
executives from 1500 firms from 1992 to 2004. They 
found that after the year 2002, firms tend to give fewer 
stock options and more restricted stocks and bonuses, 
and generally these differences are statistically 
significant. The factors that determine CEOs and 
directors compensation of S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap, 
and S&P Small Cap listed firms, are not all the same. 
ROA has positive influence on total compensation in 
the case of all CEOs and directors, with the exception 
of CEOs from S&P 500 firms, but has a negative 
influence on the number of stock options granted to 
executives for small sized companies. Mean executive 
compensation and the component weights are 
significantly different for firms across S&P 500, S&P 
Mid Cap, and S&P Small Cap indexes. Total 
compensation and forms of compensation change after 
the Nasdaq crash and enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 
Mehran (1995) has examined 153 randomly-
selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980. He found 
that there is a positive relationship between the 
percentage of total compensation in cash and the 
percentage of shares held by managers. Also there is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of total 
compensation in cash and the percentage of shares 
held by all outside blockholders. He finds a negative 
relationship between the percentage of total 
compensation in cash and both the percentage of 
outside directors and the ratio of R&D to sales. 
However the relationship between a manager’s equity-
based compensation and the firm size is not 
statistically significant. Additionally, he finds that 
both Tobin’s Q and ROA are inversely related to the 
percentage of a CEO’s total compensation in cash.   
Many US firms designed incentive compensation 
packages to insure that a CEO acts in a manner that 
maximizes wealth of shareholders (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Pavlik et. al. 1993). Both Murphy 
(1985) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) empirically 
examined stock returns as a measure of performance 
in connection with compensation plans and found that 
US CEO compensation is relatively insensitive to 
performance. Murphy (1985) argues that “it seems 
more appropriate to define performance in terms of 
shareholder returns rather than accounting profits.” 
Meredith (1990) and Sigler and Haley (1995) suggest 
that the best way to link pay and performance is to 
make a US CEO’s pay contingent upon accounting 
and market-based performance measures. In addition, 
the Relative Performance Expectation (RPE) 
hypothesis suggests that the relative performance 
(performance measured against the performance of 
competitors rather than absolute performance) has a 
stronger relationship to executive compensation (Antle 
& Smith 1986; Janakiraman et. al. 1992; Lanen and 
Larker 1992).  
Other US CEO compensation studies have 
shown that many factors contributed to the level and 
components of compensation. These factors include 
firm size, accounting- and market- based 
performances, share price, internationalization, 
governance structure and ownership structure (David 
et. al. 1998), CEO power and managerial discretion 
(Finkelstein and Boyd 1998). It has been shown that 
American CEO compensation is directly tied to 
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earnings and stock returns (Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Kaplan, 1994). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Consistent to previous studies (e.g., Kaplan 1994), we 
expect that firm size will be the major factor affecting 
CEO compensation. It means that if a CEO manages 
large corporation, she/he will expect higher 
compensation because the large corporation requires 
better managerial skills and greater effort. 
Carter et. al (2009) have examined changes in 
bonus contracts in the post-SOX era and showed that 
firms shifted the mix of compensation away from a 
fixed salary towards incentive-based bonuses after the 
implementation of SOX. This finding is somewhat 
interesting in that firms are using additional salary to 
compensate managers for the increased risk they face 
after the SOX. In order to reduce and manage risk the 
financial institutions for are seeking more objective 
performance measures such as stock price and market 
ratio. In addition financial leverage is an important 
factor of managerial control and risk management. We 
expect that CEO compensation will be directly 
affected by the market based performance measures 
such as stock price and market ratio in the post-
financial crisis period. In order to reduce firms risk, 
we expect that financial leverage will be negatively 
associate with CEO compensation. 
H1: As compared to pre-Financial crisis period, 
there is strong positive association between a CEO’s 
compensation and market-based performance in the 
post-SOX period.  
H2: As compared to pre-Financial Crisis period, 
there is strong negative association between a CEO’s 
compensation and financial leverage in the post-
Financial Crisis period. 
H3: Similar to prior period, CEO’s compensation 
is positively and significantly related to firm size. 
 
 
 
3 Sample and research methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
 
Initially all US financial firms from SIC 6000 to SIC 
6999 are selected from the S&P Executive 
Compensation data. These firms are matched with the 
S&P Research Insight database for financial data. A 
total of 78 financial institutions were selected after 
eliminating firms with missing data for 2009-2011. 
The final sample consists of 234 firm-year 
observations, 78 firms for 3 year period subsequent to 
the 2008 Financial crisis period (2009-2011). Data on 
cash compensation (salary & bonuses), long-term 
compensation, and total compensation were gathered 
from S&P Executive compensation. We have decided 
to eliminate the year 2008 because it was a transition 
year. 
 
3.2 Research methods 
 
In order to analyze data and test hypotheses, the 
following research methodology was employed. First, 
descriptive statistics for each variable were prepared. 
Then, Pearson Correlation matrices were prepared to 
examine the inter-correlation between various 
measures of performance and compensation variables. 
Finally, multiple regression analysis was conducted to 
test the significance and magnitude of the 
relationships between CEO compensation and 
performance measures. The Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) method was used to estimate the regression 
parameters.  
The natural log values were taken for cash 
compensation, long-term compensation, total 
compensation, and firm size, because these variables 
are highly skewed (Ittner, Lambert and Larker 2003; 
Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Shim, Lee and 
Corrigan 1999).  
The multiple regression models are as follows; 
 
(1) Ln (CEO Salary) = a + b Stock price  + ROE + MVE + DE Ratio + FSIZE + E 
 
(2) Ln (CEO Cash Comp; Salary+Bonus) = a + b Stock price + ROE + MVE + DE Ratio + FSIZE + E 
 
(3) Ln (CEO Incentive Comp; Bonus+Long-term Comp) = a + b stock price + ROE + MVE + DE Ratio + 
FSIZE + E 
 
(4) Ln (CEO Total Comp) = a + b Stock price + ROE + MVE + DE Ratio + FSIZE + E 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Compensation = Salary + Bonus + Long-
term Compensation 
Independent variable: 
Stock price = Average annual stock price 
(average of Monthly stock price) 
ROE = Return on Equity 
MVE = Mark-to-Book Equity Value 
DER = Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
FSIZE= Firm Size in Sales Dollars 
 
4 Results, analysis and conclusions 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample distribution by the SIC codes is presented 
in Table 1. The highest number of firms in the sample 
comes from Commercial Bank (SIC 6020), a total of 
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26 firms followed by the Casualty Insurance (SIC 
6331) with 12 firms. On average financial CEO earned 
a total compensation of $1,500,480 including salary of 
$863,688, bonus of $414,510 and other compensation 
of $222,282. 
 
 
Table 1. Number of firms and CEO compensation ($000) by industry 
 
  
No of 
Firms 
Salary Bonus 
Others 
(Stock 
Option) 
Total 
Compensation 
Commercial Bank 6020 26 1,246.646 385.082 469.022 2,100.751 
Savings Instituion, Federally 
Charterd 
6035 3 502.143 0.000 108.811 610.954 
Federal Credit Agencies 6111 1 1,108.974 338.000 75.100 1,522.074 
Personal Credit Institutions 6141 2 475.000 0.000 106.197 581.197 
Finance Services 6199 1 1,714.744 3,041.667 1,032.854 5,789.264 
Security Brokers and Dealers 6211 3 841.667 939.070 102.500 1,883.237 
Investment Advice 6282 5 558.884 94.000 150.384 803.269 
Life Insurance 6311 4 802.264 214.833 99.014 1,116.112 
Accident and Health 
Insurance 
6321 3 1,052.557 50.491 128.536 1,231.583 
Hospital and Medical Service 
Plans 
6324 4 1,033.076 458.333 243.868 1,735.277 
Fire, Marine, Casualty 
Insurance 
6331 12 1,145.729 12.241 272.940 1,430.910 
Surety Insurance 6351 4 668.458 169.525 94.511 932.494 
Title Insurance 6361 1 260.000 183.333 84.193 527.527 
Ins. Agents, Brokers and 
Services 
6411 2 1,025.623 0.000 485.757 1,511.381 
Land Subdivider & 
Developers Ex. Cemetery 
6552 1 808.333 485.691 28.180 1,322.204 
Real Estate Investment Trust 6798 6 574.901 259.889 74.649 909.439 
Average (US$1,000) 
  
863.688 414.510 222.282 1,500.480 
(Standard Deviation ) 
  
366.476 767.885 260.972 1,270.019 
Highest 
  
3,879.949 4,728.511 7,536.125 15,305.159 
Lowest  
  
90,000 0 9,800 90,000 
 
Table 2 presents sample firms’ sales revenues 
and Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT). The 
sales revenues on average are ranged from $38 
billions to $49 million.  The EBIT is ranged from $6.2 
billions to $-12 millions. 
 
Table 2. Sample sales revenue and EBIT by SIC 
 
Industry SIC Sales revenue EBIT 
Commercial Bank 6020 18,560.890 6,210.440 
Savings Instituion, Federally Charterd 6035 787.649 141.958 
Federal Credit Agencies 6111 6,578.827 4,114.066 
Personal Credit Institutions 6141 9,716.822 2,672.315 
Finance Services 6199 29,681.000 5,532.000 
Security Brokers and Dealers 6211 1,483.402 465.572 
Investment Advice 6282 2,239.239 781.620 
Life Insurance 6311 2,127.927 392.595 
Accident and Health Insurance 6321 11,121.611 1,522.756 
Hospital and Medical Service Plans 6324 38,643.156 2,696.046 
Fire, Marine, Casualty Insurance 6331 8,946.473 987.907 
Surety Insurance 6351 788.647 -461.684 
Title Insurance 6361 1,670.105 -12.993 
Ins. Agents, Brokers and Services 6411 20,302.333 1,152.100 
Land Subdivider & Developers Ex. 
Cemetery 
6552 49.967 -21.267 
Real Estate Investment Trust 6798 867.244 190.137 
 
Note: EBIT indicates Earnings before Interest & Taxes; n=78 
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Table 3 and 4 shows descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of all variables by SIC codes.  
 
Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics for all variables (2009-2011) 
 
Variables 6020 6035 6111 6141 6199 6211 6282 6311 6321 6324 6331 
2009-2012 
Salary 6.942 5.864 7.011 6.856 7.447 6.701 6.274 6.658 6.915 6.898 6.973 
Bonus 5.290 5.823 8.020 6.891 6.153 4.992 5.020 7.514 3.507 6.519 5.211 
Others 4.784 4.989 4.319 4.657 6.940 4.150 4.534 4.201 4.748 5.277 4.703 
Salary & Bonus 7.163 5.864 7.277 6.856 8.467 7.299 6.428 6.839 6.983 7.250 6.987 
Bonus & Others 5.166 4.034 6.024 4.657 8.313 6.302 5.250 5.061 5.107 5.769 4.894 
Total 
Compensation 
7.308 5.995 7.328 5.752 8.664 7.364 6.628 6.933 7.088 7.412 7.185 
Firm Size 8.238 7.137 8.792 8.597 10.298 7.051 7.440 7.308 9.030 9.713 8.384 
Stock Price 27.349 12.309 12.420 13.254 43.537 31.686 17.921 20.467 30.291 38.798 31.332 
ROE 3.661 4.953 10.955 7.289 21.258 13.234 13.738 8.392 11.673 12.411 7.770 
Market to Book 
Value 
1.559 .864 1.178 .814 3.154 2.993 1.458 .793 1.315 1.898 1.445 
Debt Leverage 61.771 71.746 35.437 75.757 31.672 52.195 29.185 43.569 29.633 35.109 23.551 
 
Table 3-2. Descriptive statistics for all variables (2009-2011) 
 
Variables 6351 6361 6411 6552 6798 Mean STD 
Salary 6.463 5.561 6.933 6.695 6.492 6.668  
Bonus . 6.186 6.656 
  
5.983 1.200 
Others 4.013 4.433 6.000 3.554 
 
4.665 0.878 
Salary & Bonus 6.606 6.094 6.933 6.347 
 
6.910 0.599 
Bonus & Others 5.148 5.589 6.000 4.344 
 
5.494 0.997 
Total Compensation 6.766 6.268 7.307 6.078 
 
6.954 0.710 
Firm Size 6.500 7.421 9.059 6.497 7.836 1.531 
Stock Price 12.904 11.453 37.830 21.916  23.571 10.893 
ROE 1.998 -4.580 24.916 -5.914  8.475 8.142 
Market to Book Value 1.386 .480 5.291 1.261  1.684 1.205 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Salary            
2. Bonus .26          
3. Others .35 .32         
4. Total Comp. .82 .63 .53        
5. Salary & Bonus .83 .66 .44 .96       
6. Bonus & Others .27 .79 .73 .66 .64      
7. Firm Size .44 .36 .39 .37 .46 .27     
8. Avg. Stock Price .48 .52 .44 .49 .48 .42 .43    
9. ROE .22 .60 .32 .21 .22 .26 .28 .27   
10. MKV to BKV .33 .71 .44 .42 .41 .42 .36 .43 .50  
11. Debt Leverage -.22 -.35 .05 -.25 -.24 -.07 .18 -.20 -.08 .01 
 
4.2 Results 
 
The results of the OLS multiple regressions are 
presented in Table 5. The results show that firm size 
continues to be statistically significant and positively 
associated with all compensation variables such as 
Cash compensation, Long-term compensation and 
Total compensation. The results confirm our third 
hypothesis that firm size is the major determinant of 
CEO compensation. It means that the larger the firm a 
CEO manages, the higher the CEO compensation. As 
was the case during the prior period, firm size 
continues to be the major determinant of CEO 
compensation. 
The results show that in the post-Financial Crisis 
period, a CEO’s cash compensation is statistically 
significant and positively associated with stock price, 
and negatively associated with financial leverage. In 
addition, CEO incentive compensation is statistically 
significant and positively associated with stock price 
and market-to-book ratio. Finally total compensation 
(TCOM) is statistically significant and positively 
associated with stock price and market-to-book ratio 
and is negatively associated with financial leverage. 
We can conclude that firm size continues to be a very 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014, Continued - 2 
 
 
257 
important determinant of CEO compensation in the 
post-financial crisis period. The finding confirms 
previous studies (Kaplan 1994) conducted in the pre-
SOX period. Our study points that in the post financial 
crisis period, CEO compensation is strongly related to 
market-based performance and is significantly, 
negatively associated with financial leverage. The 
results confirm our first and second hypothesis.  
 
Table 5. Results of multiple OLS regression analysis 
 
(2009-2011) Salary 
Cash Compensation 
(Salary+Bonus) 
Incentive Compensation 
(Bonus+Long-term Comp) 
Total Compensation 
(Constant) 5.779 (.25) *** 5.555 (.32) *** 3.526 (.76) *** 5.641 (.41) *** 
Firm Size  .104 (.04) ** (1.43) .146 (.05) ** (1.44) .057 (.11)  (1.42) .123 (.06) * (1.42) 
Stock Price .008 (.00) * (1.50) .012 (.01) * (1.51) .026 (.01) * (1.52) .014 (.01) * (1.51) 
Return on 
Equity 
-.001 (.01) 
 
(1.38) -.004 (.01) 
 
(1.38) -.001 (.02) 
 
(1.50) -.005 (.01) 
 
(1.38) 
Market to Book 
Value 
.052 (.05) 
 
(1.59) .150 (.07) * (1.59) .367 (.17) * (1.71) .195 (.09) * (1.59) 
Debt Leverage -.003 (.00) * (1.14) -.004 (.00) ** (1.14) -.001 (.00)  (1.15) -.005 (.00) * (1.16) 
Adjuste R2 0.3044 
 
0.3582 
 
0.2032 
 
0.3164 
 F-Ratio 7.5442*** 
 
9.4742*** 
 
4.7935*** 
 
8.0662*** 
 a. n = 78.   * P < 0.05;  ** P< 0.01;  *** P<0.001 
b. Regression Coefficients (β) are reported. Values in parentheses are Standard error. V.I.F. indicates 
Variance Inflation Factor. 
c. Firm size indicates a naturalized log value of sales revenue. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
In summary, there is a direct and positive relation 
between the level of compensation and firm size even 
after the financial crisis. In addition, the results also 
suggest that US CEO’s total compensation is 
significantly and positively related to stock price and 
market-to-book ratio. This research can be extended to 
other industries in order to examine whether or not the 
finding holds true for other industries. The changes in 
CEO compensation in other countries can also provide 
new insights. Firms are competing in a global market 
and top executive compensation should converge to a 
global standard to attract talented managers. The 
comparative studies of other countries such as Japan, 
Germany and UK would enlighten the link between 
CEO compensation and performance measures in 
different economic environments.  
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